Volume 147, No. 64 covering the 1st Session of the 107th Congress (2001 - 2002) was published by the Congressional Record.
The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NV” mentioning the Environmental Protection Agency was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E771-E772 on May 10, 2001.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NV
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HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY
of nevada
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, May 9, 2001
Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I include my testimony concerning nuclear waste storage at your Mountain for the Record.
I would like to thank the Chairman for allowing me the opportunity to comment on the proposed FY02 Appropriations for Energy Department, Nuclear Waste Management and Disposal relating to the Department of Energy's (DOE) proposal to store high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. This issue is critical to me because my district is located 90 miles southeast of Yucca Mountain, and it is my constituents who would be the most affected by the Yucca Mountain Plan.
More then a decade has gone by since the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act designated Yucca Mountain as the only site to be studied, and the scientific evidence against the Mountain continues to grow. Yucca Mountain is located in an earthquake and volcanic eruption zone. As recently as last month there was so much moisture at the proposed site that electrical test equipment was shorted out. It is widely known that ground water will corrode the waste storage containers, and release the deadly toxins into the environment.
Scientific evidence against the proposed Yucca Mountain site is plentiful, but just like the 1987 ``Screw Nevada'' bill, each time legitimate arguments are raised, standards for Yucca Mountain are changed. Regarding the current situation with groundwater and personal radiation dose standards, the goalposts have again been moved. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set a groundwater standard of no greater than 4 millirems, and a personal radiation dose standard of 15 millirems per year at 18 kilometers, for the first 10,000 years of waste disposal. Despite the fact that the personal dose radiation standards are significantly weaker than similar sites around the country, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has still asked the EPA to rewrite these standards to allow an even higher dose of radiation. The NRC knows full well that without reduced standards, Yucca Mountain can never be found suitable. So again, the rules must change.
On three separate occasions the State of Nevada has demonstrated, using DOE's own data, that the site should be disqualified under both the EPA standard and DOE's own internal site screening regulation. And each time, the DOE or Congress has changed regulations to ensure that Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified, regardless of the health and safety consequences to Nevadans.
In fact, the DOE has found the geology at Yucca Mountain so poorly serves the need of a repository, that over 95% of the waste isolation capability would have to be provided by metal waste containers, and other so-called engineered barriers around the waste. When this project started, the idea was to find a site capable of containing the radiation entirely through its natural geologic features. That standard has since been lowered from 100% to 5%.
Aside from the earthquakes and the potential for volcanic eruption, an aquifer flows beneath the mountain, with water moving so rapidly that even with all engineered barriers, radiation will unavoidably escape the repository and contaminate our water table. This fact is underscored by a U.S. Geological Survey report entitled ``Flooding in the Amargosa River Drainage Basin, February 23-24, 1998, Southern Nevada and Eastern California, including the Nevada Test Site.'' This document, which I would like to include with my statement, details two floods, one in 1995, and one in 1998, that, would have had severe repercussions on the proposed repository. Most notable is the conclusion that, ``Both the 1995 and 1998 floods indicate . . . that the Amargosa River, with contributing streamflow from one or more among Beatty, Fortymile, and Topopah Washes, has the potential to transport dissolved and particulate material well beyond the boundary on NTS and the Yucca Mountain area during periods of moderate to severe streamflow.'' Yet once again, in clear English, scientific evidence condemns the Yucca plan.
In addition to the mounting scientific evidence against Yucca Mountain, there are also ongoing General Accounting Office investigations into mismanagement by senior staff, and a review of the Inspector General's report on bias at the DOE.
The first issue was brought to my attention by an anonymous letter I received at my office from an individual who appears to be highly knowledgeable about the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Site Characterization Project. The letter reflects a high level of expertise and first hand knowledge. It is alarming to say the least. Among the allegations are the lack of oversight in relation to the continually escalating lifetime costs for storing nuclear waste at the mountain, unnecessary travel abroad by senior level managers, lack of experience and technical background of those in charge of the project, and an adversarial relationship between managers of the project--and this very body--the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. The General Accounting Office is still in the process of investigating these very serious charges.
As for the second issue, as you are likely aware by now, the Inspector General has found that there were several statements in the draft Overview and a note which was attached to one version of the Overview, that ``could be viewed as suggesting a premature conclusion regarding the suitability of Yucca Mountain.'' Of particular concern to me is the section of the I.G.'s report that states, ``Based on Correspondence received by the Office of the Inspector General, it is fair to observe that, at least in some quarters, public confidence in the Department's (DOE) evaluation of Yucca Mountain has eroded.'' The IG also noted disincentives at DOE for Yucca Mountain employees to question assumptions, or to, in any way, ``rock the boat.''
The Inspector General's report serves to underscore what Nevadans have been saying since the origins of the ``Screw Nevada'' bill. Politics plays the leading role in determining the fate of the Yucca Mountain project.
It is pointless to discuss how we can restore the public confidence into this doomed project. The American public has seen behind the curtain, and we cannot erase from our memory that we have seen a tainted process, driven by politics, with questionable scientific merit. The further we investigate Yucca Mountain, the more money we spend, the more obvious it becomes that Yucca Mountain is not the answer.
Scientific evidence and ongoing investigations continue to shed doubt on the feasibility of a Yucca Mountain Repository. Now is not the time to increase this budget, while the GAO continues to investigate, and science continues to condemn this plan. I again request that federal agencies change their course, and stop trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Instead of trying to change the rules to keep the proposed plan alive, they should immediately begin the decommissioning of the Yucca Mountain Project.
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